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INTRODUCTION

Our colleagues in the social sciences have been applying quantitative measures and statistical techniques to study the courts, judges,
and other legal institutions for more than half a century.' By contrast,
for decades, scholars in the legal academy who devoted themselves to
empirical 2 analysis of the law and legal institutions were relatively few,
and the published yield was fairly modest. Only twenty years ago, Professor Peter Schuck was moved to ask "Why Don't Law Professors Do
More Empirical Research?"'3 Less than ten years ago, Professor
Michael Heise still had occasion to lament "The (Relative) Dearth of
4
Empirical Legal Scholarship."
When writing those regretful words, however, Professor Heise observed that change appeared to be coming and that empirical research was "continu[ing] to emerge and at an increasingly rapid
rate."5 In the past decade, the pace of empirical legal study has quickened, and the publication of empirical studies in law journals has increased. 6 Within just a few short years, empirical study of the law in
general, and in particular of the courts, has risen to a level of prominence in American law schools. Indeed, more than one law school,
including the home of this law review, has aspired to lead the national
legal academy in the pursuit of empirical legal scholarship. 7 Thus, as
we look at the research scene today, what Professor Theodore Eisenberg has called "the thirst for systematic knowledge of the legal sysI

See, e.g., C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLIT-

ICS AND VALUES, 1937-1947 (1948).

2

In this review, I address "the subset of empirical legal scholarship that uses statisti-

cal techniques and analyses," that is, "studies that employ data (including systematically

coded judicial opinions) that facilitate descriptions of or inferences to a larger sample or
population as well as replication by other scholars." Michael Heise, The Importance of Being
Empirical,26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 810 (1999). On the question of what constitutes "empirical"
scholarship, compare Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2
(2002), which eschews the "narrow meaning" of empirical as associated with quantitative
data in favor of a "broader" inclusion of all research "based on observation or experience,"
with Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 U.
CHI. L. REv. 153, 153-54 (2002), which contends that with respect to "a broad domain of
legal scholarship" that "pursues doctrinal, interpretive, and normative purposes rather
than empirical ones," efforts to impose rules governing empirical methodology are misplaced. To be clear that I adopt Professor Heise's definition of "empirical" research, this
Essay regularly uses "quantitative" analysis as a synonym.
3 Peter H. Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 323 (1989).
4 Heise, supra note 2, at 810.
5 Id. at 809.
6 See Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law
Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 146-47 (2006).
7 See id. at 142, 158 (ranking law schools based on their "place in the [Empirical
Legal Studies] movement," with Cornell ranked comfortably in the top ten).
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tem" is more likely to be quenched by the increasing flow of
empirical scholarship. 9
From the beginning of the empirical legal studies movement in
the legal academy, the courts and those involved with the courts have
been a central object of attention by empirical scholars.1 0 Of course,
there exists an ever-expanding universe of legally oriented matters demanding quantitative analysis, 1 and judicial decisions are but a small
12
yet more visible part of the category of legal disputes in this country.
Nonetheless, the study of judicial decision making has been the vibrandy beating heart of the field of empirical legal studies, as it is also
for the discipline of law in general.1 3 Given the centrality of the
courts in our legal system, combined with the court-centric focus of
legal education, empirical analysis in the legal academy has been gravitationally attracted toward the judiciary. Thus, even as the scope of
empirical legal study continues to expand, studies of the courts and
judges remain the bellwether.
The publication in 2007 of Professor Frank B. Cross's Decision
Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals well evidences that the field of empirical inquiry within the legal academy has now reached a stage of
maturity. 1 4 Beyond providing a general sketch of the literature on
empirical analysis of the federal appellate courts (which by itself
would have made this text an invaluable resource for researchers),
8 Theodore Eisenberg, Why Do Empirical Legal Scholarship?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1741, 1743 (2004).
9 See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Matthew M. Schneider, On the Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811, 1816 (2006) ("To
claim that empirical work is now a fundamental part of legal scholarship borders on the
boring.").
10
Heise, supra note 2, at 825-28.
11 See Epstein, Martin & Schneider, supra note 9, at 1817 (finding an impressive range
]
of substantive topics under empirical scrutiny in the leading law reviews and saying "[f rom
to
context
the
tax
in
interpretation
statutory
from
law,
commercial
law
to
constitutional
the use of scientific evidence in criminal cases, from the appointment through the retirement of judges, no subject now seems beyond the reach of empirical analysis"). As an
illustration of the breadth of legal subjects that are now receiving empirical attention in
the legal academy, see the subjects of panels at the second Conference on Empirical Legal
Studies in November 2007. Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, New York University
Law School (Nov. 9-10, 2007), http://hq.ssrn.com/confprelim-program=CELS-2007.
The topics ranged from the standards of "Courts and Judges" and "Civil Litigation"
through "Corporate" and "Bankruptcy" matters to "Contracts" and "Torts" and beyond to
"Intellectual Property." Id.
12 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REv.
119, 125 (2002) ("U]udicial decisions represent only the very tip of the mass of
grievances.").
13 See Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot About Legal Scholarship?, 37 Hous. L. REv. 295,
297-98 (2000) (saying that with respect to legal ideas and their effect on the law, "[f]or
better or worse, it's in the courtroom and in legal opinions where the rubber meets the
road").
FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007).
14
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Professor Cross undertakes an innovative and wide-ranging set of empirical studies that contribute in multiple ways to our understanding
about the federal appellate courts. Drawing upon a large database of
thousands of federal appellate decisions over many decades, Professor
Cross conducts a broad-sweeping quantitative examination that focuses on a sequence of variables, grounded in a series of alternative
theories, as applied to the behavior of the federal courts of appeals
15
and their judges.
As described more fully below in this Essay, 16 Professor Cross concludes that "U]udicial decision making clearly involves a mix that includes some ideological influence, considerable legal influence, and
undoubtedly other factors."1 7 Professor Cross suggests that "the most
important theme, which runs throughout the book, is the importance
of the law in determining judicial outcomes."1 As prominently featured by Professor Cross's book, empirical study within the legal academy progressively focuses more on identifying and measuring the law
as an element of judicial decision making, rather than assuming that
only (or mostly) judicial ideology or preferences matter. 19
Together with the accumulation of an impressive body of empirical work by many legal scholars over the past decade, Professor Cross's
book confirms that we are experiencing what I will call a "Quantitative
Moment" in the legal academy.2 0 The greater value attached to empirical study of the law in the leading law schools is beginning to provide the prestige, attention, and resources necessary for quantitative
research and statistical analysis to flourish. The encouragement provided to some of the finest legal minds in our discipline to undertake
this time-consuming, labor-intensive, and painstakingly-detailed work
pushes the creative envelope in empirical exploration of the law and
legal institutions. New approaches to exploration of the multiplying
dimensions of the law are regularly being invented. New attempts to
measure elements of the law and legal process, and their influence on
legal actors and society, are constantly being developed. New statistical methods are being adapted to evaluate the correlation between
variables and legal outcomes or effects. And far from exhausting the
field of subjects for study, each newly published work invariably identifies yet another aspect of the matter that deserves further study or that
has been neglected thus far.

15
16
17

18
19
20

See id. at 6-10 (providing an overview of the book).
See infra Parts I-II.
CROSS, supra note 14, at 177.
Id. at 228.
See infta Part LB-C.
See infta Part I.
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At the same time, a consistent theme resonating throughout Professor Cross's new book is that quantitative analysis is subject to significant limitations. Empirical study has yet to demonstrate that any
extralegal factor-ideology, judicial background, strategic reaction to
other institutions, the nature of litigants, or the makeup of appellate
panels-explains more than a very small part of the variation in outcomes (when exploring large numbers ofjudicial decisions in diverse
subject-matter areas).2I Empirical studies devised to test the influence
of legal factors, such as deferential standards of appellate review and
precedent, also produce limited findings and incomplete explanations. Studies do confirm the presence of a robust correlation between judicial decisions and "the law," or at least that little part of the
law that thus far has been captured through quantitative measures.
But the larger part ofjudicial decision making in its general operation
remains unexplained by statistical models.
Accordingly, as a by-product of the growth of empirical legal
study, the indispensability of alternative means of studying the courts
has also become ever more clear. 22 Empirical study of the courts
should remain a mainstay of legal scholarship: it reminds us of the
reality of multifarious influences on judges, allows us to identify patterns that are not readily discernable in unsystematic reading of opinions, and offers us significant explanatory power in certain discrete
categories of cases. However, theoretical and doctrinal work will
never be supplanted. Judges have long insisted that the tools of the
law-the text and structure of legal documents, procedural requirements, legal history, common-law reasoning, and precedent-remain
essential elements to fully understanding and deciding a legal controversy. Because of difficulties in quantifying legal elements for empirical study, and the consequent limited explanatory power of
23
quantitative models of judicial decision making, the qualitative
21 See infra Part II.A.
22 See infra Part II.B.
23 In other academic disciplines, "qualitative" research strategies fall within the general category of empirical research. Qualitative empirical researchers tend to rely on observations or interviews in the field to gather generally non-numerical data; interpretation
of and interaction with the data occurs in an ongoing manner and simultaneously with its
collection. The results may be reported by a narrative or otherwise and are presented
without rigorous statistical analysis. See generally MichaelJ. Piore, QualitativeResearch: Does It
Fit in Economics?, in A HANDBOOK FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE FIELD RESEARCH 143, 144-45 (Ellen

Perecman & Sara R. Curran eds., 2006) (stating that the "use of open-ended interviews as a
research technique depends on the ability to draw out of the interview material something
that is interesting and meaningful," acknowledging that "interpreting interviews has always
been at least as much a matter of intuition and instinct as of systematic methodology," and
explaining that in drawing a theory out of case studies, the author has presented the "theory in a narrative form .... reinforcing the 'qualitative' flavor of the research"). As Herbert Kritzer explains, a study may be described as "qualitative, not because it contains no
quantitative data, but because it shuns sophisticated statistical manipulation of the quanti-
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forms of legal scholarship, both theoretical and doctrinal, have ample
room within which to operate and contribute to a fuller understanding of legal decisions.
For these reasons, what I would describe as a "Qualitative Opportunity" looms large today, and law schools should not be so shortsighted as to slight the traditional forms of legal scholarship, even as
they wisely encourage the quantitative methods. As empirical legal
studies comes into its prime-and theoretical and doctrinal scholarship retain their established standings within the legal academyquantitative and qualitative approaches to understanding the law and
legal institutions should bolster each other and strengthen the quality
24
and value of each.
I
THE QUANTITATIVE MOMENT IN STUDY OF THE COURTS

In Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, Professor Frank
Cross continues an encouraging trend in the empirical study of judicial decision making of focusing greater attention upon judging in the
lower federal courts, including the courts of appeals. Social scientists
and legal academics have devoted perhaps excessive attention to the
United States Supreme Court. Although the high Court is at the apex
of the judicial pyramid, empirical studies of that body are as ambiguous as they are abundant. Because of the small number ofjurists serving that unique institution, empirical studies of its members often
shade from generally applicable science into quantitative biography.
Moreover, the unique and self-selected pool of cases decided by the
Court makes dangerous the extrapolation of most empirical findings
to other tribunals. Instead, we may better understand the human actative data and relies more on textual analysis and presentation than on numerical summaries." Herbert M. Kritzer, Interpretation and Validity Assessment in Qualitative Research: The
Case of H.W. Perry's Deciding to Decide, 19 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 687, 720 (1994) (book

review). Kritzer notes that "the core of the analytic process in qualitative research revolves
around pattern identification and pattern matching, both of which occur in both the data
acquisition and data review phases of qualitative research." Id. at 701. So understood,
doctrinal legal research might be considered a form of qualitative empirical research, as it
involves collection of data from judicial opinions, constant interaction of the researcher
with that data, and efforts to identify patterns in those decisions. See George, supra note 6,
at 146 (explaining that doctrinal scholarship has an empirical component because it
"builds on the author's account of existing law in order to propose the best legal solution
to a question"). My use of the term "qualitative" in this Essay thus shares some parallels
with the concept of qualitative empirical research in the social sciences, particularly as
applied to the more descriptive forms of doctrinal research. However, I use "qualitative"
in this Essay to also encompass other forms of legal scholarship that address the quality of
the law and that have a theoretical or normative component. In particular, by referring to
"qualitative" and "quantitative" scholarship in this Essay, I mean to contrast all traditional
forms of legal scholarship with the number-crunching style of empirical legal studies.
24

See infra Part III.
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tivity ofjudging in a legal system by looking at federal circuitjudges as
the more typical judicial actors (and the federal courts of appeals as
the tribunals) that decide the lion's share of appellate cases in the
25
federal system.
As Professor Cross rightly observes, "in large measure, it is the
circuit courts that create U.S. law. They represent the true iceberg, of
which the Supreme Court is but the most visible tip." 2 6 Moreover, the
substantially larger and cumulative set of decisions participated in by
hundreds of judges in the lower federal courts, considered longitudinally across time, affords a more stable and reliable indicator of gen27
eral judicial attitudes and behavior.
A.

Examining Both Extralegal and Legal Influences on Judicial
Decision Making

Beginning his book by addressing the perennial question of ideological or political influences upon the judiciary (the "attitudinal
model" that has been political scientists' standard focus for decades),28 Professor Cross confirms that while ideology is an influence,
it is a fairly small one-weaker than legal factors in its explanatory
power. 29 He conducts the most comprehensive examination of the
25
See Donald R. Songer & Susan Haire, Integrating Alternative Approaches to the Study of
Judicial Voting: Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 36 AM.J. POL. Sci. 963, 963 (1992)

(explaining why "understanding decision making on the Courts of Appeals should be a
priority for public law scholars").
26
CROSS, supra note 14, at 2; see alsoJ. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN
THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 8 (1981) (saying, in the leading text on the federal appellate
courts of that period, that the courts of appeals are "the vital center of the federal judicial
system" (quoting J. Edward Lumbard, Current Problems of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54
CORNELL L. REv.
27
Professor

29, 29 (1968)).
Cross conducts most phases of his empirical study on the random sample
of published decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals Database, which political
scientist Donald Songer initially produced and continues to supervise. See CROSS, supra
note 14, at 3. See generally DONALD R. SONGER, REGINALD S. SHEEHAN & SUSAN B. HAIRE,
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS, at xiii-xviii, 20-22,
145-52 (2000) (drawing on the database to provide a longitudinal analysis of the judicial
selection process, the changing agenda and diverse nature of issues before the circuits, the
effect of disparity in resources of litigants who bring those actions, and influences on judicial voting-with particular attention to party affiliation and regional origins).
28
See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ArriTUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); see also Howard Gillman, What's Law Got to Do with It?
JudicialBehavioralists Test the "LegalModel" ofJudicialDecision Making, 26 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY
465, 466 (2001) (reviewing SEGAL & SPAETH, supra) (describing and criticizing the "inter-

nalized" view in political science "that Supreme Court justices (and, in the minds of many,
appellate judges in general) should be viewed as promoters of their personal policy prefer-

ences rather than as interpreters of law").
29
See CRoss, supra note 14, at 9, 28, 165-68, 228-29. Professor Cross found other
traditional variables included in empirical studies ofjudging (namely, the judge's personal
background and experience, such as race and gender) either to be insignificant or to have
.vanishingly small" effects on case outcomes. See id. at 69-93. For a general review of
judicial demographic and employment variables as they pertain to the study of judicial
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question to date, by using a large set of thousands of published decisions by the federal courts of appeals over many decades. He does so
with a refined measure of ideology and with consideration of case
types and panel effects. 30

Professor Cross finds that ideology does

have a statistically significant association with judicial outcomes (that
is, the correlation is not likely a matter of random chance), but that
'3 1
"the measured effect size for ideology is always a fairly small one."
Building on his pioneering work, by going beyond evaluating the
votes of individual judges to evaluating the behavior ofjudges acting
as members of appellate panels,3 2 Professor Cross also conducts a multidimensional study of panel effects that includes both ideological and
legal variables. After accounting for the persuasive impact of other
members of a panel and the norm of judicial collegiality, the influeace of ideology further diminishes. 33 In sum, it appears that invocation by a member of an appellate panel of "nonideological law as a
3' 4
persuasive argument [may] overcome[ ] ideological preferences.
Professor Cross has long contended that the attitudinal model,
while containing a measure of truth, exaggerates the influence of ideology because it generally ascribes judicial decisions to nothing more
behavior, see Tracey E. George, Court Fixing,43 ARIZ. L. REv. 9, 16-31 (2001); Gregory C.
Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An
Empirical Study ofJudicialReasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1377, 1451-86 (1998) [hereinafter
Sisk, Heise & Morriss, Judicial Reasoning]; Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P.
Morriss, Searchingfor the Soul ofJudicialDecisionmaking:An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom
Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 575-612 (2004).
30 See CROSS, supra note 14, at 24-38.
31
Id. at 38. For more on the effect size of ideology as an influence on judicial behavior, see infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
32 Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, JudicialPartisanshipand Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998). The CrossTiller study followed closely upon an earlier study of panel decisions by then-Professor
(and now-Dean) Richard Revesz. Richard L. Revesz, EnvironmentalRegulation, Ideology, and
the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997) (finding that the appellate panel's composition,
in terms ofjudges appointed by presidents of different parties, had a significant effect on
the outcome); see also Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposalfor Improving
AmericanJustice, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 215 (1999) (proposing the alteration of random assignment ofjudges to panels, to ensure that judges appointed by presidents of both parties sit
on each panel); Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Reply to Judge Wald, 99
COLUM. L. REv. 262, 263 (1999) (arguing that split-partisan panels on circuit courts would
.moderate ideological tendencies and encourage adherence to doctrine, thus strengthening the legal model"). On the debate concerning panel effects and appropriate responses,
see generally Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 743, 753-59 (2005).
33
CROSS, supra note 14, at 164-68. Cass Sunstein, David Schkade, Lisa Elliman, and
Andres Sawicki describe the alternative effects of contrasting ideological compositions of
appellate panels as "ideological amplification" (in which a panel constituted from the same
political party is more likely to vote in a stereotypically partisan direction) and as "ideological dampening" (in which a politically split panel is less likely to do so). CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? 8-10 (2006).
34
CRoss, supra note 14, at 168.
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than preferences and neglects to account fully for attributes of the
legal model. 5 Even as some suggested that the legal model of judging could not be systematically evaluated because its elements could
not be operationalized for empirical study,3 6 Professor Cross insisted
that legal scholars were "ideally positioned to explore [the legal
model] angle, which has been insufficiently considered by many polit37
ical science researchers.
B.

Integrating the Law into Empirical Study of Judicial Decision
Making

In this book, Professor Cross undertakes the "daunting"38 task of
integrating the legal dimension of decision making into empirical legal studies, although the effort is inevitably imperfect and incomplete.3 9 Despite the insuperable obstacles to fully specifying the legal
model of judging into a quantitative model for statistical analysis, Professor Cross finds that "[f] or every legal variable amenable to quantitative study, there was consistently a statistically significant association
40
that was robust to different samples and control variables."
First, recognizing the difficulty of devising a numerical coding for
the correct decision on a substantive point of law, Professor Cross notes
that "the legal importance of procedural rulings does enable the researcher to separate out some effect for the law."' 41 Turning to procedural rules as a "promising variable," 42 he looks first to appellate
standards of review that direct deference to trial court decisions. 43 Integrating what Professors Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg
have called the "affirmance effect" 44 into his study model, Professor

Cross adds a comparative variable based on the postulated ideological
direction of the lower court decisions. 45 When this legal variable35
See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate
InterdisciplinaryIgnorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251, 285-311 (1997).
36
SeeJEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATriTUDINAL MODEL 33 (1993) ( "[T]he legal [model] has not, and perhaps cannot, be subject to
systematic empirical falsification.").
37 Cross, supra note 35, at 321.
38
CRoss, supra note 14, at 46.
39
See Gillman, supra note 28, at 484 (explaining that empirical study can never fully
capture the influence of law because "there is a symmetry of frustration at work: if legalists
accept the behavioralist's methodological demand for a conception of law that lends itself
to determinate predictions about law-influenced behavior then they are being trapped into
accepting a conception of law that they consider inaccurate and that they know is easily
falsified").
40
CRoss, supra note 14, at 228-29.
41
Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
42
See id. at 47-48.
43
See id. at 46-53.
44
Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 150.
45
CROSS, supra note 14, at 53-56.
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affirmance deference-is explored through a regression analysis of
appellate case outcomes (in a study including various proxies for individual judges' ideology), Professor Cross finds some support for the
legal model; however, the ideological effect survives the introduction
of this variable. 46 In a further test in a panel context, Professor Cross
includes a variable designed to "capture [ ] the relative effect of the
more extreme ideological preferences among the judges" based on
the median ideological rating for a threejudge panel. Here he finds
that the law, as measured by affirmance deference, is not only "statistically significant" but also "more substantively significant" (that is, it
had a larger coefficient, indicating a more substantial effect on the
dependent variable) than alternative measures for ideology. 4 7 Based
on this evidence, Professor Cross concludes that law is a "major determinant" of case outcomes. 48 Moreover, he notes, procedural rules of
deference are "only one small slice of the legal model."49 The fact
that procedural rules "demonstrably matter in case outcomes" suggests that "substantive rules also matter, even if they cannot be readily
measured with available coding.

'50

Second, exploring legal requirements that operate as gatekeepers
for access to the federal courts (jurisdiction, standing, mootness, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and the political-question doctrine) 5' 1 Professor Cross finds that the "interposition of a legal
threshold requirement obviously ha [s] a significant effect on judicial
decisions.

'5 2

Here as well, the influence of ideology persists, but ide-

ology is not a particularly strong factor in whether a threshold requirement is satisfied.

53

Third, not surprisingly for a lower federal tribunal, precedent
proves to be an influence on judicial decision making. 54 With respect
46
47
48

49
50
51

Id. at 54-56.
See id. at 64-65.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 67.
Id.

On ideological influence on decisions involving the threshold requirement of
standing, compare Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1741,
1775 (1999), which criticizes the standards for standing rules as too easily manipulated to
political ends, thereby allowing judges to confer standing on those whose ideological goals
they endorse while denying access to the courts to those whose views are disapproved, with
Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 612, 617 (2004), which finds, in an
empirical study of standards for standing of taxpayers challenging government spending
projects, in cases across the federal judicial hierarchy, that "judges will render law-abiding
and predictable decisions in circumstances where clear precedent and effective judicial
oversight exists," but when either variable is not present, "federal judges are more likely to
decide standing issues based on their own ideological preferences."
52 CRoss, supra note 14, at 228.
53 Id. at 191.
54 See Lee Epstein &Jack Knight, Courts andJudges, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO
LAW AND SocIETY 170, 185 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004) ("When it comes to lower tribunals,
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to mandatory precedent from above, Professor Cross conducts one
phase of his sequence of empirical studies by including a pair of variables designed to compare the ideological preferences of past and
present Supreme Court panels. Although it is a crude proxy for Supreme Court precedent and was designed to measure whether circuit
judges strategically adapt decision making toward the changing ideological preferences of the Supreme Court, 55 the past-looking variable
of this pair may capture the Court's prior sense of direction in a manner similar to that of precedent projected collectively across the landscape of the law. 5 6 Indeed, Professor Cross argues that, given the

substantial specification errors in such a measure of past precedent,
the fact that it is nonetheless a robustly significant variable in this
study suggests it is "an exceptionally strong variable" and provides "evi57
dence of remarkable power for the legal model."

Fourth, in a fascinating stage of empirical study thatjointly examines the procedural factor of affirmance deference and the precedential impact of circuit court decisions, Professor Cross finds evidence of
an interaction that bolsters the legal model of judging. To measure
the precedential impact of appellate decisions, Professor Cross constructs variables from the Westlaw Keycite feature. 58 When integrating
these variables with a variable for reversal (meaning that the appellate
panel issuing the precedential decision did not defer to the district
court by affirming), Professor Cross finds that the total citations (positive and negative) to the panel's decision increase and that there is a
significant correlation between reversal and later negative precedential impact.5 9 We expect a reversal to be grounded more in law than
fact, and we would hypothesize that a reversal is more likely (on the
margins) to be an expansive ruling because it departs from the procedural norm of deference to the lower court. 60 Thus, these findings
confirm both the greater precedential effect of law-based decisions
there is little disagreement among scholars that precedent probably matters a lot-though
they disagree on why that may be so."); Pauline T. Kim, Lower CourtDiscretion, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 383, 404 (2007) (arguing that the "simplest explanation" for lower court compliance
with superior court precedent is "that judges have legal preferences independent of their
political preferences").
55

See CRoss, supra note 14, at 103-08.

See Frank Cross, Appellate Court Adherence to Precedent, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
369, 401 (2005) (suggesting that this variable, while "concededly a very rough and general
one," "should measure the ideology of many of the precedents that the circuit court panels
are applying" and thus "may capture an effect for law").
56

57
58

CROSS, supra note 14, at 122.

59

Id. at 214-15.

60

See id. at 214.

See id. at 208-12. The Westlaw Keycite feature includes information about total
citations; a yellow flag indicating a negative limitation or qualification in the use of the
precedent; and a red flag indicating that the precedent has been overruled or preempted,
at least in part, by reversal or legislative intervention. See id. at 208-09.
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and the understandable (and legally appropriate) propensity of subsequent panels to question a precedent that may have been legally aggressive. Moreover, ideology appears to be an insignificant influence
on appellate panels' reliance on precedents. 6 1 As Professor Cross concludes, "the issue of affirmance deference versus reversal is the major
determinant of precedential impact and clearly had greater effect
than judicial ideology."62

Fifth, when adding variables for types of litigants (particularly a
federal government respondent) and when concentrating on a particular type of case (specifically labor law decisions), variables that measure rules of law (proxies for deferential standards of appellate review
and for past Supreme Court precedent) become considerably more
powerful, as revealed both by the coefficients for the legal factor variables and by a distinctly higher term for the explanatory power of the
overall model. 63 This result suggests that the more fully specified the
quantitative model becomes, the more likely that legal variables will
rise to the top in terms of both significance and power of effect.
Finally, a researcher who looks for persuasive evidence of the legal model only in data drawn from appellate decisions assumes (almost certainly in error) that the most appropriate place to seek the
influence of legal factors are those cases that proceed all the way from
filing through trial and on to a published federal appellate decision.
As Professor Cross observes, "[a] study of decisions would involve only
the tip of the iceberg and fail to explain the outcome of most litigation. The importance of the law might be found in the settlements,
64
which are not studied."
C.

The Turn to the Law and to Opinion Content Analysis in
Empirical Study of Judicial Decision Making

More sophisticated statistical models tha include legal factors
and legal reasoning as variables are perhaps the greatest priority in
continued quantitative examination of the federal judiciary. A fully
specified legal model will prove eternally elusive 6 5 because legal reasoning is not formulaic in nature: the reasonable parameters for debate on the determinate nature of text and doctrine cannot be
described by number. Nonetheless, in certain categories of cases, legal factors may be more-readily submitted to crude numerical approximation. Or, with sets of cases for which types of decisions are more
61

See id. at 215, 218-19.

62

Id. at

63

See id. at 141-42.

64

Id. at 127.
See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BE-

65

227.

HAVIOR 172 (2006) (saying that, with respect to empirical study of influences on judicial
behavior, "broad measures of the law's impact remain elusive").
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directly comparable, it may be roughly possible to separate out legal
influences from other factors. Identifying those subjects and means of
study requires creative thinking and constructive analysis by theoretical and doctrinal scholars, which should be followed by quantitative
verification by empirical scholars.
Looking to the future, the turn toward the law necessitates a turn
as well toward examining and classifying the content of judicial opinions rather than merely counting outcomes in cases. 66 In one of his
most recent articles, Professor Cross and his co-author Professor
Emerson Tiller observe, "While one cannot dispute the practical sig67
nificance of outcomes, a decision to ignore opinions misses the law."
To avoid that infirmity, we must move beyond asking which litigant
prevailed in a case and now also ask how the advocates and the court
framed the question presented and how the legal analysis unfolded in
the opinion. In this way, perhaps, as political scientist Howard Gillman suggests, when he discusses the role of law in guiding but not
strictly controlling discretion, "we can begin to see how legal norms
can matter even if they cannot be mechanically applied-that is, how
law can motivate and even shape a decision without determining the
result." 68
Professor Mark Hall and Dean Ronald Wright explain that law
professors are especially well-situated and well-trained for the
"uniquely legal" task of analyzing the content of judicial opinions for
use in empirical analysis: 69
Content analysis is much more . . . than a better way to read
cases. It has the power to transform classic interpretive skills into
recognizable and transferable social science knowledge. In other
words, this method creates a vessel for exporting the analytical insights of legal scholars in a form that will be treated seriously in the
rest of the social science world. This is also more than just legal
scholars adopting scientific methods to study social phenomenon
relevant to the law, and more than social scientists studying legal
phenomena. Content analysis allows the legal academy to cross-pollinate our understanding of legal principles and institutions with
66
See CROSS, supra note 14, at 36 (noting that opinion content is "commonly neglected by empirical research").
67
Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What Is Legal Doctrine?, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 517,

523 (2006).
68 Gillman, supra note 28, at 488; see also Lee Epstein, Nancy Staudt & Peter
Wiedenbeck, Judging Statutes: Thoughts on Statutory Interpretation and Notes for a Project on the
Internal Revenue Code, 13 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 305, 322 (2003) (saying that we can achieve
a more "nuanced understanding" of judicial decision making by "consider[ing] how the
decision-makers conceptualized the legal problem under consideration").
69
Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis ofJudicial Opinions, 96
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 2-3, on file with the California Law
Review).
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the objective methods and epistemological assumptions of a social
7°
scientist.
In sum, as Professor Heise recently concluded, "After much
promise and previous false starts, it looks as though empirical legal
scholarship has arrived as a research genre."'7 1 Professor Cross's work,
in this book and elsewhere, confirms that empirical methodology has
attained prominence and a healthy maturity within the legal academy.
A mature discipline, of course, is not a retiring one. Fortunately, the
empirical legal scholar's work is never done. Each new significant
study opens new frontiers for exploration, and neglected elements remain to be incorporated within existing frameworks for better-specified and more complete analysis. The importance of judging and the
rich resource of judicial opinions ensure that subjects for study will
never be exhausted.
II
THE QUALITATrVE OPPORTUNITY IN STUDY OF THE COURTS

A.

The Limits of Empirical Study of Judicial Decision Making

Judge Harry Edwards insists that "serious scholars seeking to analyze the work of the courts cannot simply ignore the internal experiences of judges as irrelevant or disingenuously expressed. The
qualitative impressions of those engaged in judging must be thoughtfully considered as part of the equation." 72 Most legal scholars, having
worked with judges as law clerks or having spent countless hours examining the work product of judges and engaging with their reasoning in legal opinions, are well aware of how diligently and
conscientiously the typical judge works to "get it right."
A note sounded repeatedly and loudly in Professor Cross's book
is that the body of empirical work on the federal appellate courts has
yet to quantitatively account for more than a small fraction of what
influences judicial decision making. 73 I would add that, even with the
growing and ever-more sophisticated efforts to numerically code legal
70

Id. (manuscript at 47).

Michael Heise, The Past,Present, and Future ofEmpiricalLegal Scholarship:JudicialDecision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 819, 849 (2002).
72 Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit,84 VA. L. Rav.
1335, 1338 (1998). Judge Edwards argues that "scholars [should] acknowledge the limits
71

of empirical analysis of adjudication and.., adopt an appropriately modest stance regard-

ing their claims about how judging works." Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on
JudicialDecision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1639, 1689 (2003). Most empirical legal researchers have been less expansive in recent years in drawing conclusions from their findings and more forthright in observing that ideology is hardly the only, or even the most

important, explanatory variable for judicial outcomes. The cautious and nuanced nature
of the inferences drawn in Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals is illustrative of that
salutary development.
73 See CRoss, supra note 14, at 229.
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and extralegal factors into statistical variables, the translation ofjudicial decisions into mathematical constructs can never fully convey the
richness of the legal analysis contained in the written decisions of the
diverse legal disputes that come before the federal courts of appeals.
Statistical analysis simply cannot capture the full dimension of that
unique and important human enterprise known as judging.
Notwithstanding social scientists' conventional focus on judicial
ideology, Professor Cross's analysis of the decisions in the federal appellate database leads him to the conclusion that while "[i]deology
appears to be a factor in judicial decision making ....

the available

' 74
evidence can demonstrate only that it is a relatively small factor.
Indeed, when the statistical model is more fully specified with additional personal background variables or precedential impact variables,
ideology drops out of significance altogether. 75 Professor Cross's findings are consistent with the general direction of other research on the
federal appellate courts. 76 In an article in which Professor Heise and I
examined the public and academic debates about ideological influences on judges, we reported that " [t] he growing body of empirical
research on the lower federal courts ...reveals that ideology explains
only a relatively modest part of judicial behavior and emerges on the
margins in controversial and ideologically contested cases. '77 The at74

Id. at 28.

See id. at 88, 215, 218-19.
See, e.g., VIRGINIA A. HETrINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK,
JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 63-67, 70, 98, 105 (2006) (finding that ideological differences between the majority-opinion writer and another judge on a federal appellate panel
increased likelihood of a dissent, although collegial relationships and institutional controls
made the chance of any dissent small; but finding no significant ideological influence on a
decision by the court of appeals panel to reverse a district court decision); SONGER,
SHEEHAN & HAIRE, supra note 27, at 114-15 (finding a difference of 6.4% in liberal voting
on civil rights/liberties issues between Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges in
1970-1988); SUNSTEIN, SCHKADE, ELLIMAN & SAWICKI, supra note 33, at 8, 12-13 (finding
that Democratic-appointed federal appellate judges cast "stereotypically liberal" votes
about twelve percent more of the time than Republican-appointed judges on "a number of
controversial issues that seem especially likely to reveal divisions"; noting that party effects
were not significant in all areas, and even when "statistically significant, they are usually not
huge"); Nancy Scherer, Are Clinton's Judges "Old" Democrats or "New" Democrats, 84 JUDICATURE 151, 151, 154 (2000) (finding, in a study of search-and-seizure cases, that the voting
behavior of Clinton appointees to the federal courts of appeals is "statistically indistinguishable" from that ofjudges appointed by his Republican predecessor); Ronald Stidham, Robert A. Carp & Donald R. Songer, The Voting Behavior of President Clinton'sJudicialAppointees,
80JUDICATURE 16, 19-20 (1996) (concluding that Clinton's appointees have demonstrated
moderate decisional tendencies and finding small differences in "liberal" voting rates, generally under ten percent across categories of cases, for both district and appellate court
judges).
77
Sisk & Heise, supra note 32, at 746; see a/soJasonJ. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The
Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation,65 MD.L. REv. 841, 879,
883 (2006) (finding no significant ideological influence in a study of non-unanimous decisions in one federal circuit and concluding that, "in a data set that is not confined to the
most ideologically divisive issues," "[e]ither most cases do not implicate ideology as typi75

76

888
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tenuation of ideological influences becomes more pronounced when
the effects of judging on a panel are added to the model. Professor
Cross finds that the introduction of ideological proxies for other
judges on a panel reduces the effect of the proxy variable for individual judge ideology to marginal significance, leaving individual judges'
ideology with diminished effect relative to at least certain legal factors,
namely a rough measure of Supreme Court precedent and affirmance
78
deference.
Professor Cross also found other commonly explored extralegal
factors, such as the judge's personal background and experience to
"matter relatively little," with a small substantive effect even when statistically significant. 79 Other studies of the federal courts generally
have found little or no significant influence of factors such as race8 °
and gender, 81 with notable exceptions in certain types of cases. 8 2 In
cally understood or the standard proxy measures for ideology are simply too rough to be
serviceable").
78 CRoss, supra note 14, at 165-66.
79

Id. at 92.

80 See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & StewartJ. Schwab, Politics and the
Judiciary: The Influence ofJudicialBackground on Case Outcomes, 24J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 273-81
(1995); Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, InstitutionalDynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals:
Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299 (2004); Jennifer A. Segal, RepresentativeDecision Making on the Federal Bench: Clinton's District Court Appointees, 53 POL. RES. Q. 137 (2000); Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The
Diversification of the Federal Bench: Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596, 605-07
(1985).
81 See, e.g., Sue Davis, Susan Haire & Donald R. Songer, Voting Behavior and Gender on
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129, 131-32 (1993); Sisk, Heise & Morriss, Judicial
Reasoning, supra note 29, at 1451-54; Donald R. Songer, Sue Davis & Susan Haire, A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts: Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals, 56 J. POL.
425, 432-37 (1994). See generally Michael E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley, Rethinking FeministJudging,70 IND. L.J. 891, 919 (1995) ("The weight of the evidence demonstrates that
most female judges do not decide cases in a distinctively feminist or feminine manner.").
82
See, e.g., DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW 87, 147-48 (2003) (minority judges and gay rights cases); Davis, Haire & Songer, supra note 81, at 131 (female
judges in employment discrimination and search-and-seizure cases); Songer, Davis &
Haire, supra note 81, at 436 (female judges in employment discrimination cases);Jennifer
L. Peresie, Note, FemaleJudges Matter: Gender and CollegialDecisionmakingin the FederalAppellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759 (2005) (female judges in sexual harassment and sex discrimination cases); Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal
Effects of Sex on Judging 3 (Apr. 24, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1001748 (female judges in sex discrimination cases). But see Carol T.
Kulik, Elissa L. Perry & Molly B. Pepper, Here Comes the Judge: The Influence ofJudge Personal
Characteristicson Federal Sexual Harassment Case Outcomes, 27 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 69, 80-82
(2003) (no significance for race or gender of judges in sex discrimination cases); Sarah
Westergren, Note, Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals Revisited: The Data Since 1994, 92
GEO. L.J. 689, 703 (2004) (no significance for gender of judges in sex discrimination
cases). Other background characteristics, such as prior employment experience, also may
emerge as stronger influences in certain types of cases, such as a criminal defense practice
background on criminal sentencing rulings. See Sisk, Heise & Morriss, JudicialReasoning,
supra note 29, at 1383 (finding that "prior experience as a criminal defense lawyer was
significant under several formulations of our dependent variables as an explanatory varia-
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addition, while exploring whether circuit judges strategically adapt
their decisions to account for changes in the ideological preferences
of the Supreme Court, Professor Cross's study produces some perplexing results. The study finds a significant but negative correlation with
present Court preferences and a significant but positive association
with past Court preferences.8 3 But here too the explanatory power of
the full model of variables on the overall variance in the outcome of
decisions remains modest.8 4 Similarly, prior studies have found little
or weak evidence of such strategic behavior by federal appellate
85
judges.
Nor are mathematical translations of legal factors an exception to
this pattern of minimal demonstrated effect. 8 6 Even with the intro-

duction of law variables, which produces robust and statistically significant correlations, the overall statistical model nonetheless continues
to explain a modest amount of the overall variation in case outcomes. 8 7 Still, given the difficulty of integrating most legal rules into
statistical models, the law, together with the specific facts of each case,
likely accounts for much of the unexplained variation in case
outcomes. 88
Readers from outside the community of empirical scholars may
misinterpret a candid description of the boundaries of empirical analysis as a deprecation of empirical legal scholarship or as a suggestion
that the field deserves lesser attention in the legal academy. Instead,
as Professors Lee Epstein and Gary King remind us, "no matter how
perfect the research design, no matter how much data we collect, and
no matter how much time, effort, and research resources we expend,
we will never be able to make causal inferences with certainty." 89 Indeed, a recognition of the constraints of quantitative measures in explaining legal decision making is a signal of the maturity of this field
of legal study, as well as the comfort of experienced empirical scholars
with uncertainty and imperfection.
ble for opposition to the [federal] Sentencing Guidelines," describing this result as "striking," and concluding that this finding provides "greater support to the behavioral model of
judicial decisionmaking than we anticipated").
83
84

See CRoss, supra note 14, at 103-08.
See id. at 104-05, 107.

85 See, e.g.,
Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theoy of Decisionmakingon U.S. Courts
of Appeals, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 1635, 1695 (1998); David E. Klein & RobertJ. Hume, Fear of
Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance, 37 LAw & Soc'y REv. 579, 580 (2003).
86 See CRoss, supra note 14, at 229 (noting that, "[e]ven with legal variables, the models had limited explanatory power").
87 See id. at 54-55 (affirmance deference variable); id. at 165-68 (precedent and affirmance deference variables in study of panel effects); id. at 212-27 (precedential
impact).
88 See id. at 229 (speculating that "the determinants of the great residual of decisions
are unmeasured legal variables combined with the varying facts of the cases").
89 Epstein & King, supra note 2, at 37.
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Acknowledging the incremental increase in knowledge contributed by any single study and the limits of the body of empirical work
are distinctive features of the scientific dimension of this methodology. Caution in reporting results, and humility in drawing inferences,
is essential in the scientific enterprise (if not always as candidly evident as it should be in published articles, a fault that probably describes some of my own empirical work). As I have written previously,
"empirical research, with its inherent limitations in study design and
qualifications in measurement, nearly always requires treating conclusions as tentative, context-specific, imperfect, and incomplete in coming to an understanding of human behavior." 90 Fortunately, Professor
Cross is admirably candid in acknowledging those uncertainties and
humbly qualifying the inferences that may be drawn from the findings
of his comprehensive study.
Moreover, the limited explanatory power of his overall model is
inherent in the nature of this project. Professor Cross's book draws
primarily upon a national database of federal appellate court decisions. 91 That the statistical model accounts for only a small amount of
the variance in judicial outcomes is "to some degree a feature of the
92
immense courts of appeals database."
In addition, a small effect does not necessarily mean an inconsequential effect. That ideology plays any role in judicial decision making is an important and substantive finding, even with the qualifying
understanding that the effect is constrained. Furthermore, certain
variables, including ideology, are more likely to emerge and have
greater substantive effect in certain types of cases, in contrast with the
large and diverse sample of published federal appellate decisions that
serve as the primary source for the studies reported in Professor
Cross's book.
B.

The Indispensable Value of Doctrinal and Theoretical
Scholarship to the Study of Law and Judicial Decision
Making

To say that empirical analysis is but one precinct of legal scholarship and that ample room remains for other forms of scholarship is
not to minimize its importance in the least. Empirical study should
occupy a central place as the testing laboratory for legal theory and
doctrine. At the same time, empirical scholars from within the legal
discipline are more likely to appreciate the importance of the study of
law on its own terms. As Professors Tiller and Cross have written, "Le90

Sisk & Heise, supra note 32, at 746.
See CRoss, supra note 14, at 3 (referencing the United States Courts of Appeals
Database, created and supervised by Donald Songer).
92 Id. at 5.
91
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gal doctrine is the currency of the law." 93 Accordingly, those scholars
who are fluent in legal doctrine and ingenious in legal theory are indispensable to the study of law, in both normative and objective terms,
because they are able translate the law in ways that can serve as a tool
94
for further empirical examination.
As empiricists work to capture legal doctrine in quantitative
terms, and conduct experiments designed to accurately describe the
role and operation of legal (and non-legal) factors in judicial decisions, traditional doctrinal scholarship remains vital in identifying the
pertinent doctrines and sub-doctrines that apply within a field of law.
In addition, doctrine varies across and within areas of law in multiple
ways: venerability or novelty; stability or fluidity; extent of integration
within a larger coherent system of doctrine; sharpness of definition;
mandatory or optional invocation; substantive or procedural character; and reliance on bright-line rules versus discretion in the balancing
of factors or standards. Thus, Professors Tiller and Cross rightly advocate "collaborative efforts between legal scholars who understand the
legal meaning and implications of doctrine, and social scientists who
can formalize models of individual and institutional judicial behavior
as well as quantify and measure characteristics of legal doctrine in the
95
context of such models."

Theory has always been a vital foundation to empirical study of
judging, whether derived from political science or the legal academy.
As sociologist Richard Harvey Brown explains, "The fact that such theories are justified only by supplemental scientific observation does not
matter; for the definition of what constitutes such observation is also
made from the point of view of a surrounding body of theory."96 Theory provides the context for empirical research, both in terms of determining what to study97 and interpreting what has been observed.
"[O]nce data are selected for interpretation," Professor Herbert
Kritzer explains, "it is the context that allows the analyst to attach
meanings to the data. 98 No serious empirical scholar in any discipline examines the judiciary without being familiar with both the theoretical and the empirical literature on the question at hand.
Tiller & Cross, supra note 67, at 517.
See Kim, supra note 54, at 385 (arguing that "law matters in its own right and that
both theoretical and empirical efforts to understand how judges make decisions will be
enhanced by paying more attention to legal doctrine and legal norms").
95
Tiller & Cross, supra note 67, at 532.
93
94

96

RICHARD H.

BROWN, A POETIC FOR SOCIOLOGY

43 (1977).

Cf Michael J. Piore, Qualitative Research Techniques in Economics, 24 ADMIN. ScI. Q.
560, 566 (1979) (saying that qualitative research addresses the crucial "step in the epistemological process" of "identifying the variables that are worth estimating in the first
place").
98 Herbert M. Kritzer, The Data Puzzle: The Nature of Interpretation in Quantitative Research, 40 AM. J. POL. ScI. 1, 14 (1996).
97
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Even the traditional lesson of empirical study, that extralegal factors influence judges, ultimately teaches us the continued importance
of legal theory and doctrinal structure. While often overstated in both
breadth and magnitude, empirical studies certainly have confirmed
thatjudges, at the margins and in the difficult cases, are influenced by
their background, experiences, and, yes, even ideology. As I have written previously, for those of us who retain an aspirational faith in principled judging, "empirical studies ofjudicial decision making can be a
sobering splash in the face with cold reality." 99 Still, while the basic
empirical finding that political ideology explains some of the variation
among judges' decisions in certain categories of cases cannot be denied,1 00 the influence of an ideological variable should not be
overstated.1 0 1
Additionally, we should be far from satisfied with the concept of
ideology as presently applied in empirical work regarding the courts.
The InternationalEncyclopedia of the Social Sciences defines ideology as
"one variant form of those comprehensive patterns of cognitive and
moral beliefs about man, society, and the universe in relation to man
and society, which flourish in human societies."' 0 2 Nothing nearly so
sophisticated is in operation in most empirical research conducted on
the courts, whether undertaken by political scientists or law
professors.
When those applying quantitative methods to the study of the
federal courts or research on political actors refer to ideology, they
typically mean nothing more than the issue positions advocated by the
Republican and Democratic political parties or the spectrum between
mainstream conservatism and liberalism in American political discourse (which, in turn, is associated to a greater or lesser degree with
those parties). Even with the welcome introduction of more refined
measures that move beyond the most basic partisan proxies,10 3 ideology still is plotted along a single continuum from right to left and
almost invariably is tested against case outcomes without evaluation of
99 Gregory C. Sisk, Judges Are Human, Too, 83 JUDICATURE 178, 211 (2000).
100
See id. at 178-79, 211 (criticizing the "response of denial" to the empirical evidence
that judicial background and preferences influence decision making).
101
Heise, supra note 71, at 838-39 ("[T]he influence of ideology should not be overstated."); see supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
Edward Shils, The Concept and Function of Ideology, in 7 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
102
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 66, 66 (David L. Sills ed., 1968).
On the development of alternative measures of political ideology used in empirical
103
studies of judicial decision making, see Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal &
Chad Westerland, TheJudicial Common Space, 23J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007); Micheal W.
Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking FederalJudges: A Note on Policy and
Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. REs. Q. 623 (2001); Sisk & Heise, supra note 32, at
783-90; Micheal W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd C. Peppers, Measuring the Preferences of Federal Judges: Alternatives to Party of the Appointing President (June 11, 2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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the decision-making process. Seldom are ideological measures that
have been individuated for judges used in social science studies of the
lower federal courts. Instead, a proxy variable projects upon each
judge a mathematical construct derived from the preferences of political actors outside the judiciary. 10 4 The creative process then extends
further by imposing a political dichotomy on the outcome of cases,
generally assigning one side the role of "underdog" and treating a
ruling for that litigant as "liberal" (and vice-versa). In sum, empirical
researchers generally conceive of ideology in political terms as an extralegal influence on judging, rather than in legal terms, as a judicial
philosophy that describes how a judge appreciates and approaches legal problems and sources.
Theoretical and doctrinal scholars will be of invaluable assistance
to empirical research as they continue to help empirical researchers
think outside the box of political ideology. Study of the political variable certainly is an important endeavor, especially when seeking to connect actors or activity in the judicial branch with the same in the
political branches. But the politically defined concept is incomplete
when applied to courts and judges. When a measure is conceived that
captures more than conventional political preferences, or that better
evaluates the jurisprudential aspect of judicial decision making, the
subject of study may shade from political ideology into judicial philosophy. Judicial philosophy as a systematic method, though overlapping
with political ideology, arguably falls at least partly within the legal
model of judging rather than entirely outside of it.
As those with backgrounds in theoretical and doctrinal scholarship seek to define more precisely the nature of alternative judicial or
interpretive philosophies in a manner that lends itself toward some
measure of quantitative translation, our empirical understanding of
federal judicial decision making may be enriched. As but the most
recent examples available, Professors Jason Czarnezki and William
Ford-as well as Professor Cross, in his own ongoing work-have had
some success in measuring judicial interpretive strategies or methodologies. Professors Czarnezki and Ford have coded opinions for cues
or tools of interpretation, which are associated with particular philosophies of interpretation of legal texts-including the use of balancing
tests as a form of pragmatism, invocation of legislative history as underscoring legislative intent or purpose, or use of dictionaries as signaling a textualist approach. 10 5 This enhanced attention to
See Sisk & Heise, supra note 32, at 793.
See Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory InterpretativeMethodologies, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1971, 2001 (2007) (finding that Supreme Court Justices most often employ
textualist and legislative-intent methodologies; while frequency of use of particular methods differs between Justices, "the Court as a whole is quite pluralist in its methods of statutory interpretation"); Czarnezki & Ford, supra note 77, at 879, 882 (finding that neither
104
105

894

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:873

interpretive methods proceeds in the context of past and ongoing research by others, primarily (but not exclusively) from the legal
10 6

academy.

Moreover, the empirical description of one particular aspect of
the reality of judging as being subject to extralegal influence cannot
undermine the persistent normative appeal of the legal model of
judging. As Professor Kent Greenawalt has written, "The traditional
model posits as a desirable aspiration an ideal that legal decision not
depend on the personality of the judge. The aspiration is not fully
achievable even if all judges are intelligent, well-trained, and conscientious, but it is worth striving for. ....-107 Indeed, greater awareness of
the influences of judicial attitudes and preferences may encourage
greater self-conscious objectivity and heightened attention to legal
rules and norms among judges. In this respect and others, the work
applying the insights of cognitive psychology to judicial decision making holds great promise.1 08 Professors Chris Guthrie and Jeffrey Rachideology nor variables for interpretive philosophies were significant predictors of agreements among dyads of federal appellate judges, while shared experience on the bench as a
measure of collegiality did have a significant impact on agreement).
106
See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive
Quest for Neutral Reasoning,58 VAND. L. Rv.1, 111-12 (2005) (examining the use of ten
canons of construction by the Supreme Court in cases involving workplace law matters and
concluding that whether the canons "serve as a form of neutral reasoning" or instead are
"applied in ideologically slanted ways" depends upon the setting and on how the canons
are understood to have been applied by a particular legal audience); Daniel M. Schneider,
EmpiricalResearch on JudicialReasoning: Statutory Interpretationin Federal Tax Cases, 31 N.M L.
Rav. 325, 351 (2001) (studying the frequency of use of statutory interpretation methods in
Tax Court cases; finding that ideology failed "to influence the methods of construction
judges use to justify their decisions"); Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein, Peter Wiedenbeck, Ren6
Lindstadt & RyanJ. Vander Wielen, JudgingStatutes: Interpretive Regimes, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rv.
1909, 1913, 1926, 1929-70 (2005) (examining the Supreme Court's use of modes of statutory analysis, from the perspective of interbranch dynamics, by grouping interpretive regimes according to which branch of government they empower; finding greater deference
to executive agencies in tax cases than in civil rights cases, as well as "an unusual willingness on the part of the current Court" to use interpretive methods that focus on the product or process of the legislative branch); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory
Interpretation:An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. Rav. 1073, 1136-37 (1992) (examining a
random sample of statutory interpretation cases in the Supreme Court for employment of
various interpretive methods; concluding that the Court's approach is "eclectic, considering a wide range of sources of authority" and that "[d]ynamic models may best capture the
Court's practice in statutory interpretation").
107
KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 142 (1995).
108 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the
Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 29-43 (2007) (positing an "intuitiveoverride" model of judging in which judges make intuitive decisions that sometimes are
overridden by deliberation; using an evaluation of questionnaires given to state trial judges
as the basis for proposed reforms to reduce overreliance on intuition); Chris Guthrie &
Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: DisciplinaryInsights into the "Affirmance Effect" on the
United States Courts ofAppeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 357, 385 (2005) (examining the "affirmance effect" in the federal courts of appeals "through the lens of political science, psychology, and behavioral economics"); Chris Guthrie, JeffreyJ. Rachlinski & AndrewJ. Wistrich,
Inside the JudicialMind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777 (2001) [hereinafter Guthrie, Rachlinski &
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linski, and Judge Andrew Wistrich, suggest that by better "educat[ing]
themselves about cognitive illusions"'0 9 and by "temper[ing] their
confidence in their abilities," 110 judges may be able to avoid errors
and strengthen the product ofjudicial reasoning.'
Likewise, by educating judges about other subconscious factors, such as personal preferences or extralegal motivations, which are found through empirical
work to be influencing judicial decision making at the margins or in
particular types of cases or fields of law, judicial impartiality may be
enhanced.
The reality of influences intruding from outside the legal process
also serves to remind the rest of us of the need to constrain or guide
judicial discretion with law.1 12 Here too, Professor Cross has been one
of the scholars leading the way. Analogizing the law to "ropes binding
a judicial Houdini," he notes that careful evaluation of the results of
empirical research may help us "understand which brand of rope and
which type of knot are most effective and inescapable." 11 3 In his
book, for example, Professor Cross finds that the command of deference by appellate courts to trial judges (as to certain findings and decisions) has a power that "clearly exceeds all the other variables that
114
have been tested."
As another example of the constraining potential of general legal
principles that do not impose a bright-line positivist rule, Professor
Alexander Volokh argues that "methods of interpretation can matter,
to the extent different methods make different results more plausible."1 15 He suggests that if a method of interpretation (such as textualism) were to gain dominance over competing methods so that a
judge could no longer self-select interpretive methods to reach a preferred outcome in a case, then the true nature of the interpretive
method would emerge, a greater constraint on judicial choices would
Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind] (reporting the results of a study of federal magistrate
judges and finding evidence that trial judges use mental shortcuts, or heuristics, to make
judicial decisions); JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & AndrewJ. Wistrich, Inside the BankruptcyJudge's Mind, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1227 (2006) (conducting an experiment on specialist
court judges to examine judging from the perspective of cognitive psychology). For a discussion of social psychology and the audiences to which judges seek to present themselves
as affecting judicial behavior, see generally BAUM, supra note 65.
109 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Inside theJudicial Mind, supra note 108, at 821.
110 Id. at 824.
111 See id. at 821-25.
112
See Michael A. Perino, Law, Ideology, and Strategy inJudicialDecision Making: Evidence
from Securities FraudActions, 3 J. EMPiwCAL LEGAL STUD. 497, 505 (2006) (explaining that
law, while "not completely determinate," may "still act as a constraint that limits the discretionary space in which a judge may operate").
113
Cross, supra note 35, at 326.
114 CRoss, supra note 14, at 178.
115 Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory ofJudges and Every-

one Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcomingJune 2008) (manuscript at 5, on file with the NYU
Law Review) (providing a theoretical model of judicial choices of interpretive methods).
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be realized, and some of the apparent political differences in application of interpretive methods would be washed out.1 16 Creatively designed empirical studies might compare and contrast the constraining
effect of interpretive methods in jurisdictions that have arrived at a
more uniform approach toward interpretation of certain types of legal
texts.
A human enterprise that asks even well-trained persons to judge
the correct (or most correct) answer to a dispute based on the human
construct of law could never achieve perfect objectivity. Empirical
scholarship can show us where the judicial system is reasonably effective in exerting a "classic legal tug" 1 17 against personal judicial preferences or attitudes, and where it falters. Theoretical and doctrinal
deliberation then may suggest ways to shore up the foundations weakened by subconscious bias or inadequate legal definition.
III
THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF EMPIRICAL AND TRADITIONAL
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IN UNDERSTANDING
THE COURTS

Legally trained scholars, including those with advanced degrees
from other disciplines and those who primarily conduct quantitative
research, have an advanced understanding of legal doctrine and theory.l' 8 In contrast with similar movements from earlier historical periods, such as the Legal Realists of the early- to mid-twentieth century,
the empirical legal studies movement has been neither triumphalist
nor deprecatory toward other approaches to the study of law and legal
institutions. Indeed, precisely because empirical scholars in the legal
academy have cautiously tended to refrain from claiming to have uncovered pervasive and powerful extralegal influences on judges-a
caution well-justified by the results of published studies-the door remains open for cooperative scholarly interchanges between those conducting different forms of legal research that focus on or are relevant
to judicial decision making.
Now that empirical research is well established as a full partner in
the advancement of knowledge and understanding about the law and
efforts to improve the law, the legal academy should recognize and
encourage the complementarity of the empirical approach with the
traditional forms of legal scholarship. When empirical analysis fails to
116
117
118

See id. (manuscript at 5-6).
See CROSS, supra note 14, at 200.
See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1741 (stating that, when it comes to conducting

empirical research, "nonlawyers have the distinct disadvantage of often not understanding
legal doctrine or the state of law," which "sometimes leads to blunders that compromise
empirical analyses").

2008]

THE QUANTITATIVE MOMENT

897

provide a complete explanation for a body of judicial decisions (as it
invariably will), theoretical and doctrinal analysis may step in to flesh
out the model being constructed to explain or critique developments
in the law. When theoretical and doctrinal scholars explore new
trends or movements in the law, empirical study provides a means for
determining whether the supposed patterns truly have taken hold in
the courts" 19 or whether other factors not so readily apparent instead
explain at least some of what is transpiring. 2 0 As Professors Clermont
and Eisenberg explain, "opinion-reading and data-mining can reveal
1 21
different things, and both are independently worth doing."
When empirical scholarship demonstrates the persistent influence of extralegal factors or some form of bias in a particular category
of cases, theoretical and doctrinal analysis may suggest means by
which the legal texts or substantive or procedural rules might be modified to constrain or channel the exercise of judicial discretion or to
mitigate inappropriate or unintended influences. These measures, in
turn, could then be tested in action by another wave of empirical
study. Moreover, further education for legal actors about the teachings of theoretical, doctrinal, and empirical legal studies will allow everyone to undertake more effectively their responsibilities.

119 See, e.g.,
Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort
Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 642-44, 693-95 (1987) (finding that, while the growth
of constitutional tort caseloads is not trivial, constitutional tort litigation is neither as prevalent nor as burdensome on courts or government defendants as commonly thought); Andrew P. Morriss, Developing a Framework for Empirical Research on the Common Law: General
Principles and Case Studies of the Decline of Employment-at-Will, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 999,
1020-56 (1995) (studying the evolution of the common-law doctrine of wrongful discharge); Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the
Rise ofEmployment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REv. 679, 681-82 (1994) (finding that, contrary to the
myth arising during industrialization that the employment-at-will rule reflects a bias against
employees, "the real significance of the at-will rule was the rule's location of authority to
end an employment relationship" and "the judicial adoption of the rule reflected the benefits to judges of a simple, clear rule which was consistent with the contemporary style of
legal analysis"); Gregory C. Sisk, How Traditionaland Minority Religions Fare in the Courts:
Empirical Evidence from Religious Liberty Cases, 76 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1021, 1023-24, 1033-37
(2005) (finding that, contrary to conventional wisdom, adherents to traditionalist Christian faiths face greater obstacles obtaining judicially-ordered accommodation for religious
conscience than do members of minority religions).
120
On extralegal (and unacknowledged) influences on judicial decisions, see supra
notes 29-34, 73-85. On legal factors as explanations for judicial decisions, see supra notes
35-64, 86-88.
121
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Judge Hany Edwards: A Case in Point!, 80
WASH. U. L.Q. 1275, 1286 (2002). Herman Pritchett, the pioneering empiricist in political
science, explained that such a quantitative method gives additional meaning to social science inquiry, while acknowledging that "[a] box score is no substitute for the process of
careful analysis of judicial writing by trained minds using all the established methods for
coaxing meaning out of language." C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 189-91 (1954).
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Whereas scientific study of legal matters is primarily descriptive,
"only useful in discovering and understanding what iS,"122 "doctrinal
scholarship engages the legal scholar in a process of creation[ ]"123
and theoretical scholars may "participate in the construction of legal
regimes." 124 In addition, when quantitative researchers identify
problems or patterns from the numerical data analyzed by statistical
methods, qualitativeresearchers, through their engagement with theory and doctrine, may provide better insight into what empirical
scholars are finding and what it means. 12 5 Together, these different
but complementary forms of legal scholarship provide the means to
establish a better foundation for the rule of law.
Political scientists C.K. Rowland and Robert Carp have lamented
the "unnecessary, deleterious bifurcation between qualitative legal
scholarship and quantitative social science research"' 2 6 in which these
counterpart disciplines "barely acknowledge, much less complement,
each other."127 As empirical legal research continues to mature, we
should see an increased respect for, and collaboration across, academic disciplines around the university, especially between law professors and law-and-courts political scientists whose subjects overlapand who have so much to say to each other. 128 But if true interdisciplinary dialogue is ever to be achieved, it surely must begin with an
integration of the quantitative and qualitative dimensions within the
discipline of the law itself. And what may, and should, prove distinctive about the quantitative and qualitative enterprises as conducted
within the legal academy is a concerted and sympathetic engagement
with law, not to the neglect of other influences or dimensions but
taken seriously on its own terms.
CONCLUSION

Legal scholar and appellate advocate Paul Bator, in a paper published after his untimely death, reminded us that " [t] he judicial power
122

David J. Herring, Legal Scholarship,Humility, and the Scientific Method, 25
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L. REv. 867, 872 (2007).

Id. at 873.
Id. at 874.
125
See Kritzer, supra note 23, at 689 n.6 (saying that at the interpretation stage of the
research process, "quantitative researchers could profitably look to the methods of qualitative research for insights into what is being done").
126
C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DIsTIcr
COURTS 149 (1996).
127
Id. at 150.
128
See Lee Epstein & Gary King, Building an Infrastructurefor Empirical Research in the
Law, 53J. LEGAL EDUC. 311, 316 (2003) ("[L]aw schools should encourage their faculty
into collaborations with scholars who know how to conduct serious empirical research....
Legal academics need not waste precious time learning the details of every possible new
skill and instead can rely on coauthors, who presumably would benefit from the substantive
expertise that law faculty bring to the table.").
123

124
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is neither a Platonic essence nor a pre-existing empirical classification.
It is a purposive institutional concept, whose content is a product of
history and custom distilled in the light of experience and expediency."' 129 While Bator was addressing the evolution of the institutions
adjudicating disputes within the American constitutional framework,
his words convey the complexity of context, the varied nature of controversies, the diversity of actors, the multifarious factors of analysis,
and the real-world influences of setting, history, practicality, and expediency that are all implicated in judicial decision making. It should be
no surprise, then, that the multi-faceted form of human reasoning involved in legal judging cannot be captured by one discipline, nor be
fully understood by one analytical approach.
Bator denied that the constitutional judicial power could be defined by "a rigid logical scheme" or be described in a "mechanical
way." 130 By methodological definition, then, quantitative measures
that ultimately require mechanical application can only take us so far
when we set out to explore this human enterprise.13 1 Because judging, even when principled and attendant to the law, is not itself a scientific process, it cannot be fully explained by a scientific method.
Neither, however, can study of the law-that intensely practical question of how a society orders itself and the relations between citizens by
the rule of law applied through legal institutions-be taken seriously
if it fails to be regularly connected to the real world as described by
empirical study.
Through his book, and his other previous and continuing work,
Professor Cross has succeeded in liberating the empirical study of judicial decision making from a myopic focus on ideology and partisanship without naively ignoring the role that those factors play in the
129
Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts
Under Article Ill, 65 IND. LJ. 233, 265 (1990).
130 Id.
131 That is not to deny that empirical study may contribute in substantial ways to the
understanding of non-mechanical behavior, which of course describes the nature of study
for all social science research. Indeed, a researcher who appreciates that the law is not "a
mechanistic, autonomous force" that dictates a definitive answer to every dispute may better be able to identify the influences of legal factors on judging. See Mark J. Richards &
Herbert M. Kritzer,JurisprudentialRegimes in Supreme CourtDecision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCL
REv. 305, 305, 315 (2002) (conducting empirical study through construction of 'Jurisprudential regimes [that] structure Supreme Court decision making by establishing which
case factors are relevant for decision making and/or by setting the level of scrutiny the
justices are to employ in assessing case factors"); see also Herbert M. Kritzer & Mark J.
Richards, JurisprudentialRegimes and Supreme Court Decisionmaking: The Lemon Regime and
Establishment Clause Cases, 37 LAw & Soc'v REv. 827, 839 (2003) (using jurisprudential regimes as a theoretical framework for empirical analysis of Establishment Clause decisions
and concluding that "[l]aw does matter when the justices of the Supreme Court decide
cases"). Rather, I mean in this Essay only to insist that the non-mechanical nature of judging makes it impossible for quantitative measures to capture everything or for numbercrunching to explain everything.
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human enterprise ofjudging. Professor Cross has been willing to look
beyond the cynical supposition that everything about judicial decision
making revolves around the person, personality, and personal preferences of the deciding judge. As much as any other empirical researcher, he has moved the question of law to the front burner.
Among legal scholars studying the courts, no one has contributed
more to the integration of the quantitative and the qualitative approaches to legal scholarship than Professor Cross. In his prodigious
body of work, he has worked to operationalize the legal model in statistical studies ofjudging, bringing to bear his legal training to identify
and creatively measure such factors as precedent, procedure, standards of review, interpretive methods, and elements of doctrine for
quantitative analysis. His work has borne much fruit already, scientifically establishing that "[1]egal rules are much better determinants of
outcomes than is judicial ideology.' 132 Beyond the concrete findings,
Professor Cross has suggested that much of what remains unexplained
by empirical methodology is likely to be found in the neither formulaic nor wholly subjective application of legal reasoning by judges.
In Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, Professor Cross simultaneously enhances our understanding of the courts through solid
empirical analysis and candidly acknowledges that empiricism cannot
describe the whole of the cathedral. In this way, he points the way
toward continued progress in the quality and effectiveness of quantitative study, while providing an opportunity for the enhanced relevance
of theoretical and doctrinal work to our collective understanding of
judicial resolution of human disputes through the law.

132

CROSS, supra note 14, at

9.

